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I.

Introduction

Professor Marci Hamilton has written a forceful and obviously heart-felt book
that should give pause to committed champions of religious free exercise.2 She argues
convincingly thatreligious freedom is too often invoked to shield opprobrious and
socially harmful activity, and she describes numerous examples of such abuses that make
any civilized person’s blood run cold. Her avowed aim is to debunk the “hazardous
myth”3 that religion is “inherently and always good for society”4 and to increase public
awareness (just as her eyes were “forced open”)5 of the dark side of religion in
contemporary American public life. She advocates a restrictive constitutional test for
government accommodation of religious practices and supports vesting sole
decisionmaking responsibility for administering that test in the legislature. To this end,
she proposes a principle that measures the social harm that protection of religious belief
would entail. “The right free exercise doctrine[,]” Hamilton says, “gives a wide berth to
religious belief, but follows the rule that no American may act in ways that harm others
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without consequence.”6 Hamilton also repeatedly invokes the concept of the “public
good” (or “common good” or “public interest,” as she variously calls it)7 to justify her
restrained views of religious accommodation.
This review offers a critical appraisal of God vs. The Gavel, in particular of
Professor Hamilton’s discussion of the complicated idea of the public good and how it
intersects with the proper consideration of religious free exercise interests. In Part II, the
review explains the structure of the book and the framework for Hamilton’s conclusions
about religious accommodation. It emphasizes several instances of Hamilton’s use and
explanation of the concept of the public good. Part IIIarticulate s Hamilton’s general
theory of the public good, breaking the concept down into several distinct categories
suggested by the book itself. The review critiques the book’s explanation and application
of the public good principle and suggests thatit is an ambiguous and unstable concept,
and one that often substitutes for either particular interests or the author’s policy
preferences on a variety of issues.8 Part IV offers some observations about the principal
virtue of God vs. The Gavel: Professor Hamilton’s bracing and illuminating exposition of
the range of recent and ongoing abuses justified in the name of the free exercise of
religion. The review concludes by considering whether religious interests can ever play a
role in the determination ofHamilton’s public good , and if so in what way.
II.

God vs. The Gavel
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The book is divided into two parts. The first discusses six contexts in which
religions or religious devotees have used their constitutionally privileged status to protect
themselves unjustifiably or improperly advance their interests. The second sets forth the
state of constitutional free exercise doctrine, with particular positive emphasis on
Employment Division v. Smith9 and City of Boerne v. Flores.10 It defends the principles
underlying those cases by tracing the historic decline of the idea of religious
accommodation. In the final chapter, Hamilton posits “three necessary conditions for
legitimate religious accommodation,”11 the last of which focuses on Hamilton’s key
concept of the public good.
a.

God

Despite occasional reference to the beneficent power of religion and religious
belief,12 this book is about religion as a force of evil. It is also driven primarily by the six
real-life, self-consciously concretized contexts that Hamilton examines, each one chock
full of actual cases and specifics. Some of the cases are ongoing and Hamilton herself
has participated as an advocate in several of them. This fact-intensive approach befits
Hamilton’s own educative mission for the book. She is none too keen on the insulated
blindness of the ivory tower; experience with actual cases, in her view, is a much needed
antidote to what she believes is the commonly shared, “rose- colored,” idealized
conception of the role of religion in American culture. 13 Hamilton’shighl y
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contextualized approach informs approximately two thirds of the book; she explores the
harmful role that religious institutions have played in the life of children and the active
debates about marriage, land use, schools, prisons and the military, and discrimination.
The sexual and physical abuse of children by persons either operating under
religious auspices or motivated by religious belief launches Hamilton’s first section. She
provides several examples of misused religious authority that have led to the tragic and
horrifying abuse of children, offering newspaper-style summaries of the facts and
litigation history of past and ongoing cases. She also excoriates religious institutions for
“actively aid[ing] and abet[ing] the abuse,”14 though what she generally means is that the
institutions’ reaction to evidence of abuse was often enough to suppress the evidence and
insist on silence in an effort to protect their finances and public image.15 Hamilton
bristles with indignation both at the abuses and the cover-ups, and it is at this point that
the building blocks of her general theory of religious accommodation begin to appear:
A church does have the right to believe at will, but it has no right to use those
beliefs to justify illegal conduct. In effect, this reading [the one she opposes] of
the First Amendment immunizes actions that display callous disregard for
society’s most important norms.16
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Hamilton moves from sexual abuse to a discussion of medical neglect,17 child
abandonment,18 physical abuse,19 and failure to provide a safe environment for children,20
peppering her treatment of each with highly disturbing accounts of child exploitation in
the name of religious freedom.
How is it that U.S. law and society have failed to protect these children? The
answer, Hamilton claims, lies in the historic misuse of the First Amendment to shield
religious organizations from liability for the harm they do. According to Hamilton, this
“false understanding of free exercise” was rectified in the Supreme Court’s Smith
decision, which “explained that neutral, generally applicable laws certainly can be
applied to religious conduct.”21
The fault, too, lies in twin fallacies of the popular imagination: the American love
affair with religion already mentioned and the belief that contemporary society is hostile
to religion and religious values. She blames certain academic voices for feeding into
these misapprehensions. Her bête noire on this score is Professor Stephen Carter’s The
Culture of Disbelief,22 which she claims misrepresents the realities that most people in the
country are religious believers,23 that religious viewpoints “fill the public square,”24 that
religion is not “always moral . . . [or] as innocuous as apple pie,”25 and that religious
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interests are not “politically powerless.”26 Hamilton contends that the perpetuation of
these myths by Carter and others has enabled religious organizations to stage a kind of
socio-legal power-grab, all the while maintaining the appearance of weakness.27
All of this is rather hasty. Nowhere in his book does Carter claim that most
people in the country are not religious or that religion does not affect the public views of
many Americans or that religious interests are politically powerless:
[R]eligion matters to people, and matters a lot. Surveys indicate thatAmericans
are far more likely to believe in God and to attend worship services regularly than
any other people in the Western world. True, nobody prays on prime-time
television unless religion is a part of the plot, but strong majorities of citizens tell
pollsters that their religious beliefs are of great importance to them in their daily
lives. And today, to the frustration of many opinion leaders in both the legal and
political cultures, religion as a moral force and perhaps a political one too, is
surging.28
Likewise, though Carter certainly does discuss at length the moral dimensions of
religious belief and its important role in American public life, he does not claim that
religion everywhere and always has been benign or that it is to be unthinkingly embraced:
The religions enjoy no special immunity from the tendency of power to corrupt –
and of absolute power to corrupt absolutely. As I write these words, people are
being slaughtered for their religious beliefs in India, in Bosnia, and in various
parts of the Middle East. Closer to home, . . . the African slave trade and the postCivil War oppression of the freed slaves and their progeny were often justified by
a variety of Scriptural passages and Christian doctrines. Indeed, there is virtually
no evil that one can name that has not been done, at some time and at some place
and to some real person, in the name of religion.29
It is true that Carter advocates for a prominent place for religious thought and belief in
the public square, but he also says:
Yet one who argues, as I do, for a strong public role for the religions as bulwarks
against state authority must always be on guard against the possibility – no, let us
26
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say the likelihood – that some religions will try to use the privileged societal
position that the First Amendment grants them as an instrument of oppression.30
The point of this seeming petulance is certainly not to engage Hamilton in a game
of “gotcha” with respect to what may (generously) be called an incidental point in her
argument (and, after all, she knows what Carter said). It is instead to note a leitmotiv in
her presentation of ideas, and one which will resurface at the climactic point when she
must defend her own crucial concept of the public good. It is this: Hamilton frequently
sounds very much like an advocate (and perhaps intends to). This is understandable
given her profound involvement in a long-running, “fundamental difference of opinion”31
between Congress and the Supreme Court that began in 1990, and her sincere belief in
the rightness of Smith and Boerne. Her passionate voice makes for stimulating reading,
particularly when it comes to the specifics of the gripping cases and legislative histories
with which she has developed such mastery. But it is less effective when she presents
and analyzes concepts relevant (either because she opposes or espouses them) to her
philosophical and constitutional views.
Her chapter on marriage provides a useful exampleof this phenomenon . The first
sub-part treats gay marriage and addresses the well-known decision of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court32 and the critical response of the federal legislature in 2004.33
Hamilton makes plain that she sides with the SJC and the right of gay people to marry.
She believes that those opposed to gay marriage are interposing their religious beliefs
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where they have no business, and thereby subverting the public good: “Once the debate
cannot be framed by one religious tradition, the door has been opened to a more
appropriate public debate over the common good.”34 Hamilton roundly criticizes the
views of Professor Robert P. George, a natural law theorist who opposes gay marriage.
Relying on George’s comments in a Wall Street Journal op-ed, this is how Hamilton
characterizes the natural law position on gay marriage:
Apparently, [according to natural law] the physical characteristics of males and
females predetermines the law of marriage. [George’s] circular reasoning implies
that no legislature should consider the issue other than to reach his religiously
based conclusion, a conclusion once again that is an argument from theocracy, not
public policy. Accordingly, he promoted the idea of a federal constitutional
amendment to ban all marriages other than those between a man and a woman,
without entering into the debate over what forms of marriage are best for children,
the economy, or the public good. His is a revealed legal regime, not a reasoned
one.35
One need not be a natural law expert or adherent to sense that much is missing in
this assessment. Hamilton’s spare statements about the bases for opposition to gay
marriage from a natural law perspective36 – that its position is “revealed” rather than
“reasoned” and that it prescinds from the debate over the common good – are,
respectively, incomplete and flatly incorrect. It is true that the Summa Theologiae was
intended by Aquinas primarily as a teaching tool for those sharing his religious beliefs,37
and that natural law theory historically has been associated with Roman Catholic
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teaching.38 But to say that a position based in natural law is not “reasoned” but
“revealed” is to ignore the highly rational, practical impetus that its adherents claim
drives the tradition. In elaborating his understanding of natural law, John Finnis (to take
one natural law theorist who also opposes homosexual marriage)39 is emphatic that
“practical reason,” not revealed truth, is the guiding principle by which people may
decide what it is moral.40 Of marriage, Finnis says:
The good of marriage is one of the basic human goods to which human choice
and action are directed by the first principles of practical reason . . . . [T]he good
of marriage [is] the way of life made intelligible and choiceworthy by its twin
orientation towards the procreation, support and education of children and the
mutual support and amicitia [friendship] of spouses who, at all levels of their
being, are sexually complementary.41
In criticizing this position, it is possible that Hamilton means to say that the
natural law view of gay marriage (accepting for the sake of this point thatFinnis’s and
George’s position is representative) is not accessible (as opposed to either irrational or
unintelligible) to people who do not share certain religious convictions, and so should not
be relied upon in political decisionmaking. This argument would be reminiscent of
Professor Kent Greenawalt’s reflections about whether nonaccessible grounds should be
excluded as bases for political decisions.42 Greenawalt also discusses the difficulties in
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disentangling the religious and non-religious reasons thatmay jointly inform a particular
political judgment.43 Hamilton might be arguing for the exclusion of any political
judgment whose basis cannot be entirely disentangled from religious belief because
religious beliefs are not accessible, and therefore any judgment that implicates religious
belief is not accessible. But if Hamilton intended to proceed along this line of inquiry –
that is, with an eye toward arguing for the total exclusion of the influence of religious
belief from public political judgment (or debate) – then it is odd that she unequivocally
rejects the plausibility of such an approach.44
It could also be that Hamilton means that though the Finnis/George view of gay
marriage is at some (remote) level accessible, it is not persuasive on grounds of reason
alone. For example, Hamilton might claim that she, like many others, cannot reconcile

believes . . . . This does not mean that reason plays no part in the development of religious convictions.
Possible religious understandings may be measured against various tests of reasonableness. But something
more is involved: a choice or judgment based on personal experience that goes beyond what reason can
establish.”). A belief based on revelation would in most circumstances not be accessible, unless the
believer can point to a historical, evidentiary record to support it. Id. at 41. A belief would be
“unintelligible” if the believer could not render his belief comprehensible to others. Thus, a belief based on
revelation might often be intelligible though not accessible.
43
See, e.g., id. at 88-89. Taking as his point de départ the natural law view that “virtually all[] ethical and
political truths are accessible to common human reason, [and] that understanding these truths does not
require an understanding of religious truth,” he dissects the problem of intertwining bases of belief: “In my
discussion of what constitutes reliance on religious grounds in chapter 6, I mentioned how religious
premises may intertwine with naturalist reasoning . . . . I also mentioned a second problem, that people may
believe natural arguments are sound because of religious authority, not because they perceive the intrinsic
force of the arguments. A third problem is a variation on the second; someone might find the natural
arguments somewhat persuasive by themselves, but be much more certain of their truth because of
religious belief.”
44
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292-93, but this is a misreading. See Kent Greenawalt, Religion and American Political Judgments, 36
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 401, 404 (2001) (“My own answer to the place of religious grounds is an
intermediate one . . . . I believe legislators [Professor Greenawalt distinguishes between officials and
citizens, and then again among officials between legislators and judges] should give greater weight to
reasons that are generally available than to reasons they understand are not generally available. But some
reliance on religious reasons is appropriate, especially since the generally available reasons are radically
indecisive about some crucial social problems.”).
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the Finnis/George position by reference to pure reason, and that she therefore suspects
that religious convictions are lurking in the background. Hamilton might say that though
the natural law proponent starts with a principle that most people would accept as rational
(e.g., “one of the primary goods of marriage is procreation”), he reaches, by a step-bystep process of what he claims is “reasoning,” conclusions that are highly controversial
and not commonly shared (e.g., “homosexual marriage is morally wrong”). To this, the
natural lawyer might reply that his beliefs are rationally discoverable by all persons, but
that the measure of their objective truth is not taken by reference to what most people
happen to believe.45 It therefore still remains for Hamilton to explain why the
Finnis/George position on homosexual marriage cannot be explained by reason alone.
She might claim that the kind of reasoning deployed to justify the Finnis/George view is
altogether too categorical and abstract, that it draws arbitrary and implausible distinctions
– ones not based on reason at all – and that itdoes not give enough wei ght to real-world
experience.46
In the argument I have constructed, it is at this point that Hamilton’s second
criticism of the Finnis/George position on gay marriage could resurface. Hamilton might
say that it is in the consideration of real-world experience that one is most rational about
the common good;47 or as Professor Greenawalt has said in the context of assessing the
rationality of natural law’s claims about the wrongfulness of homosexuality and its
45
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have seemed convincing at one time appear to be shot with error, even ridiculous, at a later time. As moral
agents, we must choose between the weight to give to theory and the weight to give to experience when the
two conflict.”).
47
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implications for same sex marriage,48 “we have sounder and less sound ways to reason
about moral matters, and . . . an approach in which experience receives greater weight is
sounder than highly abstract, categorical analysis.”49 Yet the “common good” is a
concept of vital importance in the natural law views of George and Finnis; it relates to the
rational pursuit of self-evident human goods, which itself implies some kind of appeal to
tangible and accessible evidence.50 Consideration of the “good of marriage” by reference
to “what forms of marriage are best for children,” either from a theoretical or an
experiential point of view, is precisely what the natural law has in mind.51 Nevertheless,

48
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191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (“The institution of marriage as
a union of man and woman, uniquely involving the procreation and rearing of children within a family, is
as old as the book of Genesis.”); Heup v. Heup, 172 N.W.2d 334, 336 (Wis. 1969) (“Having children is a
primary purpose of marriage.”); Zoglio v. Zoglio, 157 A.2d 627, 628 (D.C. App. 1960) (“One of the
primary purposes of matrimony is procreation.”); Frost v. Frost, 181 N.Y.S.2d 562, 563 (Supr. Ct. New
York Co. 1958) (discussing “one of the primary purposes of marriage, to wit, the procreation of the human
species.”); Ramon v. Ramon, 34 N.Y.S. 2d 100, 108 (Fam. Ct. Div. Richmond Co. 1942) (“The procreation
of off-spring under the natural law being the object of marriage, its permanency is the foundation of the
social order.”); Stegienko v. Stegienko, 295 N.W. 252, 254 (Mich. 1940) (stating that “procreation of
children is one of the important ends of matrimony”); Lyon v. Barney, 132 Ill. App. 45, 50 (1907) (“[T]he
procreating of the human species is regarded, at least theoretically, as the primary purpose of marriage . .
.”); Grover v. Zook, 87 P.638, 639 (Wash. 1906) (“One of the most important functions of wedlock is the
procreation of children.”); Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 1980), aff’d 673 F.2d
1036 (9th Cir. 1982) (observing that a “state has a compelling interest in encouraging and fostering
procreation of the race”).
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if Hamilton had wanted to take on the Finnis/George position as I have suggested, she
might have found an inquiry into the theoretical/experiential bases of reason and the
public good a fruitful one.
This is not the place for full assessments of these difficult views and Professor
Hamilton is, of course, at liberty to disagree with George’s rejection of gay marriage as
inconsistent with the common good. But Hamilton’s critique of natural law theory as
sub- or supra-rational requires greater elaboration and her claim that such an approach
does not account for the common good makes one wonder exactly what she means by
invoking the concept. Again, these may appear to be quibbles about non-essential
matters, but theyare germane to Hamilton’s explanation and defense of her own public
good concept.
Hamilton concludes Chapter Three with a discussion of polygamous marriage.52
After presenting the arguments of Mormons for the legal protection of polygamy, and
noting that there is no constitutional right to polygamous marriage, Hamilton poses the
following tests for measuring whether polygamy should be accommodated: “The
question is not whether polygamists may trump the law, but rather whether polygamy can
coincide with the public good[]”53; “The question for public policy is whether the
practice of polygamy is consistent with what is best for society, period[]”54; and
“[Legislators] must also always ask whether the conduct in question comports with the
public good, and that means they must examine with some care how the conduct impacts

None of this, of course, necessarily speaks to whether homosexual marriage threatens the public
procreative aim of marriage (the advent of reproductive technologies, such as in vitro fertilization, may be
relevant in assessing this issue), or whether the public good of marriage has in some way changed so as to
render procreation less vital.
52
HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 66-77.
53
Id. at 68.
54
Id. at 72-73.
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others.”55 Hamilton appears to have answered these questions for herself. She believes
that polygamy perpetuates inequalities between the sexes and may be inconsistent “with
the rule of law and democracy.”56 Other topics relevant to assessing the “public good” of
polygamy, according to Hamilton, should include its unclear impact on issues of child
custody, inheritance, and even the spread AIDS in Africa.57
Hamilton’s own legal expertise is showcased in Chapter Four, which describes the
conflicts that arise when religiously inclined land owners seek to use their property in
ways that threaten the character of residential communities. She has considerable
experience litigating these cases, most often representing the party opposing the religious
accommodation (i.e., the locality or the neighbors).58 She describes vividly the acrimony
generated by these disputes: a religious person who wishes to expand his home to
accommodate greater numbers of worshippers; the often enormous increase in traffic and
commerce such plans mean for a residential neighborhood (“generating a traffic pattern
more evocative of a grocery store than a home”)59; the transformation of a once-a-week
house of worship into a “multiple-use service center[]”60; the arrival of the homeless,
seeking food, shelter, and spiritual guidance, into the residential areas, and the resulting
deterioration of the neighborhood61; and the inevitable legal entanglements and
concomitant ill will among neighbors, including charges of discrimination.62
Hamilton places the blame for these problems (and many others for what she
believes is over-zealous religious accommodation) on two federal statutes, the Religious
55
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Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) of 1993,63 which was partially struck down in City of
Boerne v. Flores,64 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(“RLUIPA”) of 2000.65 RLUIPA requires that if the state passes a land use law that
imposes a “substantial burden” on the religious use of property, it must demonstrate that
the law serves a compelling state interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering
that interest.66 With more than a hint of bitterness,67 Hamilton argues that Congress
abdicated its responsibilities to the common good because it failed properly to explore the
likely effects of RLUIPA on the rights of homeowners and the relationships among
neighbors: “RLUIPA has turned neighbor against neighbor and is one of the most
religiously divisive laws ever enacted in the United States.”68
It bears reflection whether the antagonisms that Hamilton identifies were
simmering all the while. RLUIPA may have changed the legal landscape, but it seems
doubtful (or at least, Hamilton has not made a strong case for the position) that RLUIPA
(and RFRA before it) created or even significantly exacerbated the hostilities between
these competing interests. “[D]ivisive religious discord”69 about the proper use of land is
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a product of conflicting private interests and beliefs about the good life. As Hamilton
suggests, that strife may well be driven by the evolving nature of religious practice in
America and its incompatibility with other, competing, interests (such as traditional
notions of home ownership, the desire for a certain kind of neighborhood character, or the
efforts of a municipality to control expansion). Still, Hamilton’s criticisms of RLU
IPA
as a potentially aggravating force in this process ring at least partially true; by imposing a
heavier burden on localities to justify land use laws affecting religious institutions,
RLUIPA could give the religious institutions an advantage, or at least a standing, that
they previously may not have enjoyed.70 Yet this is hardly the same as contending that
such an advantage demonstrates that the public good has been disserved, let alone
ignored; it simply demonstrates that Congress has made a choice about where the public
good lies. Providing an attractive haven for the homeless or encouraging the
establishment of institutions that will see totheir spiritual and physical needs may well
displease neighboring landowners. They will be disturbed and their property values
probably will suffer. But it would not be unreasonable, let alone an obvious capitulation
to special interests, for a legislator to conclude that these measures would nevertheless
advance the public good. Similarly, though Hamilton dismisses the idea that landowners
and townships may have discriminatory reasons for opposing religious land usages in
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their neighborhood,71 the RLUIPA legislative record “contained statistical, anecdotal and
testimonial evidence suggesting that [religious] discrimination is widespread and
typically results in the exclusion of churches and synagogues even in places where
theatres, meeting halls, and other secular assemblies are permitted.”72 Hamilton
disagrees with this characterization of the record, argues that allegations of discrimination
were fabricated or inflated for political advantage, and believes that relevant voices were
not consulted.73 But these are not very interesting arguments – evidentiary points that a
lawyer might make in a summary judgment brief – and unworthy of her theoretical
claims about what is best for American society. More interesting is to assume that the
evidence is as Congress believed it to be, and to discern precisely what Hamilton means
by invoking the concept of the public good to support her claim that Congress ignored
it.74
Hamilton’s discussion of RFRA’s and RLUIPA’s effect on the prison system is at
once fascinating and slightly irritating. She begins the chapter by detailing the despicable
activities and recruiting tactics of white supremacist organizations and gangs in prison.75
Other than a lonelyquote from a member of the Aryan Brotherhood that the act of killing
is rewarding because “it’s a holy cause,”76 the connection between these groups’
activities and their religious motivation is not readily apparent from Hamilton’s
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treatment. In fact, one has the sense that Hamilton may be overreaching in arguing for a
pervasive link between the two in order lend rhetorical support to her opposition to
RLUIPA and accommodation generally. To be clear: I am not suggesting that such
connections do not exist; they do. Some white supremacists do derive their views from
religious organizations, such as the Church of Jesus Christ Christian, Aryan Nation. I
mean only to point out that the book’s portrait of the activities of white supremacist
gangs, in and out of prison, does not make clear whether religious convictions are, as a
general matter, of crucial importance to white supremacist beliefs. Still less clear is the
effect that RFRA or RLUIPA has had on the proliferation of white supremacist belief or
violence. The evidence that Hamilton presents that prisons have become a breeding
ground for radical Islamic organizations is much more compelling, as is the connection
between the failure of moderate Muslim imam recruitment for the prison population and
the consequent infiltration of extremist Muslim chaplains, who are more likely to distort
Islamic belief and inflame the hatred of those already susceptible to terrorist
indoctrination.77 Against the backdrop of these two problems, Hamilton again launches
into a diatribe against RLUIPA: it was a craven capitulation to special interests, its likely
effects were not adequately investigated, contrary views were not sought, and the public
good was ignored.78 Hamilton is rather perfervid here, concluding with the confident
prediction that the Supreme Court would in short order strike down RLUIPA.79 The
Supreme Court unanimously disagreed with her in Cutter v. Wilkinson,80 holding that
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section three of RLUIPA (governing persons confined to institutions) did not violate the
Establishment Clause.
In answer to the question, “How much trouble can religious accommodation [in
prison] be?”,81 Hamilton reels off an impressive and extremely amusing list of the sundry
dietetic, grooming-related, literary, and sartorial requests made by prisoners on the
ostensible basis of religious belief.82 The Church of the New Song, for example, insists
that its adherents be served sherry and steak every Friday at 5:00 P.M. in order to
participate in the “celebration of life.”83 Hamilton cleverly uses this absurd case as a foil
for her anti-accommodation arguments, but at least some of these gross abuses, as well as
the cases of dangerous activity in the name of religious belief, could be dealt with by
applying Cutter’s dicta that:
It bears repetition, however, that prison security is a compelling state interest, and
that deference is due to institutional officials’ expertise in this area . . . . Further,
prison officials may appropriately question whether a prisoners’ religiosity,
asserted as the basis for a requested accommodation, is authentic. Although
RLUIPA bars inquiry into whether a particular practice is “central” to a prisoner’s
religion, . . . the Act does not preclude inquiry into the sincerity of a prisoner’s
professed religiosity . . . .84
Hamilton would likely disagree with this position. She would contend that courts are
institutionally incompetent to perform these kinds of inquiries; legislative action, free
from the sway of special interests, is needed if the public good is to be protected.85
Before turning to the now long-forestalled exploration of Hamilton’s concept of the
public good (in which her fondness for individualized legislation is discussed), a word
about the second part of the book is necessary.
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b.

The Gavel

Part Two of the book is primarily about Supreme Court doctrine and
constitutional history. Hamilton divides the Supreme Court’s free exercise jurisprudence
into a “dominant” and a “competing” doctrine. The dominant doctrine embodies two
principles: “religious entities, just as much as any other citizen, can be forestalled and
prohibited from harming others and thus can be made to obey a myriad of laws,” and
religious institutions must not be “subjected to laws that are hostile or motivated by
animus toward religion in general or any sect in particular.”86 The dominant doctrine was
first expressed in Reynolds v. United States,87 a case upholding a federal antipolygamy
law. Because the statute did not target Mormons in particular, Hamilton argues, but
merely expressed a neutral public policy preference against polygamy, the law passed
both strands of the dominant doctrine.88 Where religious animus is “patent,” as in
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah,89 Hamilton argues that the second
strand of the dominant doctrine is violated, and the courts properly intervene. The
“competing” doctrine is an aberrant strain of free exercise cases that applies strict
scrutiny (at least in name)90 to generally applicable, neutral laws.91 The competing
doctrine was repudiated in Smith, “and the rule of law prevailed.”92
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Congress reacted rapidly to Smith (as Smith itselfobliquely suggested that it
might)93 by enacting RFRA, whose flaws by Hamilton’s lights have already been
discussed. The Supreme Court then invalidated RFRA as it applies to states and
localities on federalism grounds in Boerne. Hamilton attributes Congress’s
“overreaching” in RFRA to a kind of swollen ego; its historic successes in enacting civil
rights legislation in the sixties, and the deference accorded that legislation by the courts,
grew into “dogmatic belief in the unassailability of whatever Congress attempted.”94 Yet
the trend seemingly signaled by Smith and Boerne, and hailed by Hamilton as
manifesting the proper exercise of judicial constitutional oversight, was dealt a blow by
Cutter v. Wilkinson. Relying on the principle that there is “room for play in the joints
between” the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses,95 the Court held that Congress’s

here.”); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987) (denial of unemployment
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special solicitude for the religious interests of institutionalized persons was constitutional.
It may be argued that the Court’s treatment of RLUIPA in this context is unique, because
the government’s control over institutionalized persons is “severely disabling”96 to
religious interests. The Court’s “foremost” reason for upholding RLUIPA, however –
that it “alleviates exceptional government-created burdens”97 – is perhaps a reference to
the strong evidentiary basis in RLUIPA’s record justifying the accommodation; this may
not distinguish it from the land use context.98
Whatever the future holds for section 2, and for continuing congressional efforts
at religious accommodation, Hamilton’s view that Boerne represents some sort of historic
fulcrum or “culmination of U.S. legal principles”99 seems to have been considerably
undercut by Cutter. Her highly readable, though speedy, chapter on the history of
religious accommodation in England and early America, emphasizing the decline of the
moral authority of religious institutions (the iniquities in the name of the “religion of the
realm,”100 from the Inquisition to the Star Chamber to the Tower of London, are briefly
recounted)101 and the rise of the common law and the “no-harm” principle102 is all aimed
96
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to cast the reasoning of Boerne and Smith as the apex of enlightened thought about
religious accommodation. The focus of her final chapter, “The Path to the Public Good,”
brings us to the crux of the matter.
III.

The Public Good

One of the most intractable difficulties with Hamilton’s conception of the public
good is that it does not account for the reality, which she herself loudly proclaims, that
religion is very important to many Americans. Since that is so, isn’t it likely that people
for whom religion is important will feel that their religious beliefs can and should, at
some level, shape the public good? Hamilton appears to concede this point.103 And since
religious convictions often do affect the citizenry’s (including the legislature’s)
understanding of the public good, on what grounds does Hamilton criticize the
introduction of those perspectives into the public domain?104 Hamilton uses the concept
of the public good throughout her book and, whatever else may be said about it, she is
emphatic that it is vitally important and that religious belief alone should not establish its
contours. In what follows, the review offers and explores a number of possible
philosophical commitments that might undergird Hamilton’s concept of the public good.
a.

The Public Good as the No Harm Doctrine

Hamilton often invokes the concepts of the public good and the no harm doctrine
as if they meant roughly the same thing: “[R]epresentatives must consider whether the
liberty accorded is consonant with the no-harm rule. If so the public good has been

job by God to fulfill,” which for the legislator is the pursuit of the public good. Marci A. Hamilton,
Republican Democracy is Not Democracy, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2529, 2533 (2005); see also Marci A.
Hamilton, Direct Democracy and the Protestant Ethic, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES, 411, 438-51 (2004).
102
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am simply interested in exploring Hamilton’s reasons.
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properly served. If not, the public good, and therefore the constitutional order, has been
subverted”105; “In a republican form of democracy like this one, the laws are enacted to
serve the larger public good, and no one should be permitted to harm another person
without account”106; “[T]he duties created by a democratic government – the law – are
created for the purpose of furthering the public good, which is served when bad actors are
deterred from harming others and punished if they do.”107
The overlap between the no harm doctrine and the public good is at its least
controversial when one considers Hamilton’s arguments about child exploitation by
religiously motivated persons.108 It seems intuitively reasonable and appealing to argue
that the public good is advanced when the physical security of children is achieved at the
expense of the rights of alleged child abusers to shield their misdeeds in the name of
religious freedom; the same can probably be said of the interests of religious
organizations to withhold documents or other information relevant to child abuse
investigations and the interests of religiously motivated parents to withhold necessary
medical treatment from their children. These are clear instances of substantial interests in
physical security and health competing against less important interests.
Perhaps less obvious is a situation in which the safety of schoolchildren is
measured against, say, the religious interest of a male Sikh student in carrying a
ceremonial knife under his clothing.109 At first glance, the potential for substantial harm
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might intuitively outweigh the accommodation; but adequate precautions could be taken
to limit considerably the occasions for physical harm. Naturally, the state has a
compelling interest in the safety of its students and the carrying of knives does not sit
easily with that interest, but Hamilton does not explain why various measures short of
prohibiting the kirpan altogether could not serve the state’s interest just (or nearly) as
well. For example, one court has suggested that the kirpan could be “blunted or dulled,”
as well as sewn into a sheath, in order to protect the safety of students, and these are
surely not the only possible measures to reach a religious accommodation while at the
same time protecting student safety.110 It is not clear why Hamilton claims that “[o]nly a
flawed legal doctrine would lead a court out on such a weak limb. Knives are knives, and
children are not safe in their presence, no matter who they are.”111 A kirpan with a dulled
edge and point, sewn into a sheath, and perhaps made of something other than metal
(plastic, for example) might satisfy the religious and state interests. Knives may be
knives, but, to paraphrase Magritte, this is not a knife.112
The controversial edges of Hamilton’s no harm doctrine come into focus in some
of the other contexts she discusses, particularly where the idea of physical harm does not
apply. For example, Hamilton might say that legislative opposition to gay marriage
harms homosexuals, in that it prevents them from enjoying marriage, “a social construct
that must be determined in light of the common good, not by the reflection of any
particular group’s religious beliefs.”113 One possible objection, raised earlier,114 would
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be that permitting homosexual marriage harms the institution of heterosexual marriage
(whether viewed from the perspective of moral realism or, as Hamilton does, as a social
construct) and those engaged in it. Hamilton might then reply that the objection is illtaken because it injects religious belief into a secular debate, or because the objection
inappropriately relies on religious reasons.
“Anyone who advocates the Harm Principle owes us an account of harm[.]”115
What sort of harms count in Hamilton’s calculus? In the context of religious
accommodation, Professor (now Judge) Michael McConnell has written in support of the
principle that “we are free to practice our religions so long as we do not injure others.”116
Likewise, Professor Douglas Laycock has recently stated that “some religious practices
must be regulated or prohibited to prevent some significant temporal harm to others.”117
Both of these writers, with whom Hamilton vigorously disagrees about the scope of
religious accommodation, are making arguments that harm is a necessary condition for
enforcement of laws that limit religious freedom; that is, absent the causing of some
serious harm, legal regulation of the free exercise of religion is improper. Hamilton
seems to be making the same claim. If all three agree as to the basics of the no harm
principle, how do we account for their disagreement in its application?
The answer may be that, in practice, the no harm principle is no longer a
necessary condition for exercising the state’s coercive power because “non-trivial harm
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arguments are being made about practically every moral offense.”118 Focusing on the
existence or non-existence of harm cannot answer the question of comparing harms. Nor
can an emphasis on “conduct” as distinguished from “intentions” or “attitudes” neatly
identify the type or category of harm that should concern us. As Professor R.A. Duff has
explained in the context of his theory of punishment:
The harm suffered by the victims of central mala in se crimes (such as murder,
rape, theft, violent assault) consists not just in the physically, materially, or
psychologically damaging effects of such crimes but in the fact that they are
victims of an attack on their legitimate interests – on their selves. The
harmfulness and wrongfulness of such attacks lie in the malicious, contemptuous,
or disrespectful intentions and attitudes that they manifest, as well as their
effects.119
If the no harm principle ever served as a useful threshold determination, it no
longer does so; most allegations of moral harm now meet (or at least claim to meet) that
threshold. For example, in Hamilton’s land use discussion, we have already observed the
clash and in some cases incompatibility of rival interests (e.g., those of residential
neighbors, religious institutions and their potential adherents, and municipalities). All of
these groups could plausibly claim to be harmed by political judgmentsantithetical to
their interests.120 No resolution to these conflicts is readily apparent by reference to the
no harm principle alone, or even to “balancing the harms”if the frame of reference for
measurement is the no harm principle itself. The interests at stake may not only be
incompatible but also incommensurable. That is, there may be no way to decide between
118
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rival positions simply by measuring “harm” (or their respective potential for “good,” for
that matter).121 How does one measure interests in religious liberty against those in
property rights, as gauged by their respective potential for harm? Yet Hamilton
nevertheless claims to have a clear view about where the public good lies.
There are also some circumstances discussed by Hamilton in which the no harm
doctrine has little apparent relevance to discerning the public good. For example,
Hamilton raises the relatively recent phenomenon of what she refers to as “religious
prisons” and others have called faith-based rehabilitation programs, noting that “[t]here
appears to be an increasing amount of evidence that suggests that some religious
programming in prisons can reduce the recidivism rate.”122 Other than the possibility that
inmates would be coerced by the state to participate in such programs against their will
(which would certainly be a harm, but which Hamilton does not suggest is occurring), the
“harm” in these programs to the participating offender, qua religious123 and as Hamilton
has reported them, is difficult to locate; and, in fact, Hamilton’s skepticism about the
programs derives from something other than their capacity for harm.124 Thus, I conclude
that while a harm calculus is in some cases intuitively related to Hamilton’s public good
considerations, the no harm doctrine severely underdetermines what she means to express
by the public good.
b.

The Public Good as the “Rule of Law” or “Ordered Liberty”
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There is a kind of antagonistic symmetry in the title of the book from which one
could reasonably infer that Hamilton is contrasting religious accommodation with the
“rule of law”: as “God” is to “The Gavel,” so “Religion” must be to “The Rule of Law.”
Hamilton often refers to the rule of law as closely related to, if not the same as, the public
good. For example: “Those who sacrifice the interests of women and children in the
name of religion, or the rights of homeowners to religious landowners have imposed a
system that demotes the public good to a secondary value. They have subverted the rule
of law.”125
What does Hamilton mean by the rule of law?
The rule of law is a canopy of mutual protection reached through legitimate
processes, under which all members of the society must abide by the same rules
and observe the rule of no harm to others. The rule of law is diminished when
individuals may use their personal beliefs to avoid the law and to harm others.126
Hamilton’s particular inspiration for her rule-of-law ideal as applied to religious
accommodation derives from the holding and reasoning of Justice Scalia’s majority
opinion in Smith; otherwise neutral laws of general applicability whose incidental effect
is to inhibit religious expression do not offend the First Amendment, the alternative being
an anarchic system in which “each conscience is a law unto itself.”127
The venerable concept of the “rule of law” has been expressed in many ways.
Ronald Dworkin, for one, has formulated it this way:
Law insists that force not be used or withheld, no matter how useful that would be
to ends in view, no matter how beneficial or noble these ends, except as licensed
or required by individual rights and responsibilities flowing from past political
decisions about when collective force is justified . . . . This characterization of the
concept of law sets out, in suitably airy form, what is sometimes called the “rule”
125
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of law. It is compatible with a great many competing claims about exactly which
rights and responsibilities . . . do follow from past political decisions of the right
sort and for that reason do license or require coercive enforcement.128
There is obviously one aspect of the rule of law, captured by Dworkin’s statement (and
others’),129 that is procedural (or “instrumental”)130; laws should be clear, they should be
validly enacted, they should be applied generally and consistently, and like cases should
be treated alike.131 Along similar lines, Professor Ronald Cass has listed four traits of the
rule of law: “(1) fidelity to rules, (2) of principled predictability, (3) embedded in valid
authority, (4) that is external to individual government decision makers.”132 Hamilton
certainly intends at least this procedural sense of the rule of law when she contends that
“religious conduct must be governed by the same laws that govern the rest of us.”133
This hardly ends the inquiry however, because adherence to the procedural sense
of the rule of law does not necessarily explain why interests in religious accommodation
are “like” (all) other interests, and should be treated as such for rule-of-law purposes. In
fact, there is prima facie constitutional evidence that interests in religious free exercise
are not “like” many other interests that the law might infringe upon or protect.134 There
is no constitutional limitation on lawmaking as to the rate of speed one may travel on a
public road. A law that sets the speed limit surely infringes on one’s freedom of
movement. Few would claim, however, that an interest in traveling as fast as one wants
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and an interest in practicing one’s religion freely are “alike,” in the sense that the
government should bear the same burden to justify regulating either activity.
Is there, then, a more substantive sense of the rule of law that could explain
Hamilton’s reliance on it to support her anti-accommodation argument? Some would
answer no.135 Those that might answer yes do so by reference to a “point” or “reason”
for the rule of law that Hamilton might dispute.136 For example, Professor Todd Zywicki
has identified “Constitutionalism” as “[t]he first value of the rule of law.”137 By this he
means that “government power is constrained by “the law,” an external force [by] which
political decision-making must abide . . . . The rule of law enhances individual freedom
by permitting individuals to choose and pursue their own ends in life, without improper
influence from the state.”138 Thus, even those who subscribe to a more substantive vision
of the rule of law ground their understanding of the public or common good on some
concept (“constitutionalism,” “liberty,” “human dignity,” and so on) distinct from the rule
of law.139 Hamilton cannot use the rule of law itself synonymously with her conception
of the public good.
135
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Many of the same points may be made of Hamilton’s use of the phrase “ordered
liberty” in connection with the public good, in this book and elsewhere: e.g., “Judicial
deference to the military in prisons is not the end of religious liberty; it’s just ordered
liberty.”140; “The liberty that is consonant with the public good is ordered liberty, which
takes into account both liberty and the public good.”141
The phrase “ordered liberty” has a rich and controversial constitutional history
that Hamilton oddly does not mention, including its memorable use in Palko v.
Connecticut142 and its progeny. Perhaps she omits such a discussion because her concept
of ordered liberty has little to do with advocating for special protections for constitutional
rights, and more to do with a muscular view of government power, one that is little
different than the holding of Smith. The phrase was also used by Chief Justice Burger in
his majority opinion in Bowen v. Roy.143 Faced with a free exercise challenge, the
Supreme Court there upheld a Pennsylvania statute that required a state agency to use a
social security number in administering certain programs, notwithstanding the claim that
use of the number would violate plaintiffs’ Native American religious beliefs. Chief
Justice Burger offered this rather uninstructive statement:
The First Amendment’s guarantee that “Congress shall make no law . . .
prohibiting the free exercise” of religion holds an important place in our scheme
of ordered liberty, but the Court has steadfastly maintained that claims of
just and sane society. The fear of discretion that is shared by both [A.V.] Dicey and [Friedrich] Hayek is
well grounded by the more explicit modern treatment of property rights, which shows that ill-defined
property rights lead to legislative intrigue, political favoritism, and massive uncertainty, all of which tend to
reduce the levels of both liberty and utility. But if the rule of law . . . is necessary for a just and sound
society, it is a very different question to ask whether it is sufficient to achieve that result . . . . [T]he choice
of the best, even the best achievable, form of political organization demands more than faithful adherence
to the rule of law can provide.”).
140
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religious conviction do not automatically entitle a person to fix unilaterally the
conditions and terms of dealings with the Government.144
As an explanation of the substantive principle of “ordered liberty,” this statement offers
little, if anything, in the way of guidance. To the extent it does, however, the principle of
ordered liberty is used here as an argument in the service of greater, not less, religious
freedom.145
On Hamilton’s concept of ordered liberty and its association with the public good,
the criticisms of Professor Carl Esbeck merit lengthy reproduction:
Certainly a republic needs “ordered liberty,” and no one responsible argues to the
contrary. But the American republic is also about limited government. Achieving
[Hamilton’s] goal of the “public good” requires balance. That is, neither church
nor state is absolute, and there are some matters concerning which neither can
legitimately invade the space of the other. Professor Hamilton’s argument
assumes the very issue in debate rather than addressing it. No one is pressing for
immunity for religious institutions from the rule of law to the detriment of the
public good. Rather, the debate involves defining the contours and limits of the
public good. Who gets to decide what is good for the public? When does a
pluralistic secular society have to live without a singular rule of law in order to
accommodate the multiple opinions of what the rule ought to be? Who gets to
decide what it means to be a bishop, how he is to go about doing his job, how
intensely must he supervise the priests in his charge? [Hamilton] obviously is
outraged by the Catholic Church sex abuse cases (who isn’t?), but the imposition
of criminal and tort liability in that worst of all cases does not explode the idea of
church autonomy. Rather, it is just a clarification of the location of the churchstate boundary such that the state may impose liability in the extreme cases of
abuse.146
Like Hamilton’s invocation of the rule of law, “ordered liberty” is merely a starting point,
a fixed number in the complicated equation that may or may not produce the public good;
144
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it tells us nothing about the substantive content of her beliefs as to where the public good
lies.
c.

The Public Good as a Legislative, not Judicial, Function

In theory, Hamilton thinks that the legislature is institutionally superior to the
other government branches when it comes to deciding on the proper scope of free
exercise.147 Hamilton emphasizes a few, unremarkable structural virtues of the
legislative process – the ability to take voluminous testimony pertinent to the particular
issue, to consider a wide variety of sources, to reverse or modify prior enactments, and
“to reject facts and theories presented to them”148 – that render it the preferred forum for
public good determinations. There are many others.149
The difficulty for Hamilton as a practical matter is her frequent disappointment
with actual legislative decisions that ostensibly aimed at the public good in the context of
religious accommodation (RFRA and RLUIPA, for two), as well as her assessment of
Congress’s bloated delusions of grandeur in the twentieth century.150 Still, we have at
least gone a short distance in defining Hamilton’s public good; we have concluded that it
is exclusively a legislative consideration (or, perhaps, that it is the legislature’s
prerogative to assign it in its discretion). Nevertheless, though we may have descried the
locus of its determination, we surely have not yet encountered a full explanation of the
147
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public good’s content. Our next eligible interpretation builds on the legislative focus,
drawing on the implications in Hamilton’s statement that “[a]ll legislative judgments
should include consideration of the public interest in order to achieve the ideals of a
republican form of government.”151
d.

The Public Good as Legislative Civic Republicanism

The tradition and (not-so)152 recent revival of civic republicanism is much
concerned with the “public good” as a modelfor political decisionmaking , especially as
contrasted with the view that decisions are (and, perhaps, are best) made through the
“simple aggregation of private preferences resulting from “deals” among self-interested
groups.”153 Much of the religious accommodation that Hamilton decries can be
explained by reference to a kind of faith in an idealized legislative civic republicanism–
the hope that “the elusive voice of the “public good,” momentarily audible above the din
of power politics, carries the day.”154 Hamilton refers positively, in passing, to legislative
civic republicanism as a theory that might support her ideas about accommodation.155
She yearns for the “right sort” of legislator: “What is desperately needed in Congress is
some member who can rise above religious lobbying to secure the larger good – members
151

Id. at 300 (emphasis added).
See Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, A Book of Laughter and Forgetting: Kalman’s “Strange Career” and the
Marketing of Civic Republicanism, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1025, 1025 (1998) (book review) (“In the mid1980s, it was still breaking news in the legal academy that the Lockean tradition of classical liberalism and
individual rights was not the only conception of politics to have shaped the ideas and actions of American
political actors and lawmakers.”).
153
Amy Sinden, In Defense of Absolutes: Combating the Politics of Power in Environmental Law, 90 IOWA
L. REV. 1405, 1447 (2005).
154
Id.; see also Frank I. Michelman, Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (1986)
(citations omitted) (“Republicanism’s ‘animating principle’ is said to be civic virtue. Civic virtue is in turn
defined as ‘the willingness of citizens to subordinate their private interests to the general good.’
Cultivation of this general spirit is ‘government’s first task.’ Republicanism favors a highly participatory
form of politics, involving citizens directly in dialogue and discussion, partly for the sake of nourishing
civic virtue.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1548-57 (1988)
(discussing the four common commitments of civic republicanism of deliberation, political equality,
universalism, and citizenship).
155
HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 206.
152

35

that at least ask if there is another side to an issue raised by a religious entity, without
being its servant.”156
In laying out her arguments for legislative civic republicanism, Hamilton
contends that the U.S. legislature is not a majoritarian institution. Once the majority
elects its representatives,
[t]he system simultaneously frees the representatives to do what is best for the
country – even if the people do not fully understand the issues or agree on the
course taken – but [sic] it also imposes the difficult burden on elected
representatives to make independent decisions in the larger public interest.157
As proof, Hamilton offers the racially prejudiced public mood of the 1960s; the
sentiments then prevalent, she argues, did not prevent the federal government from
enacting legislation to protect racial and other minorities. So, too, it has not prevented
the agendas of “lobbyists representing the disabled, and homosexuals, and racial
minorities” from faring better in Congress than those of “amorphous majorities.”158
Hamilton’s prior writings about legislative anti- majoritarianism indicate that
perhaps we are on the scent of Hamilton’s “public good.” For Hamilton, the dangers of
popular self-rule are allayed by the Constitution’s “delegation of decision making”
responsibility to the legislature.159 Mob rule is averted because “[r]epresentatives are free
of their constituents’ instruction as they are simultaneously driven to consider the public
good in a fishbowl of public scrutiny within which they operate and seek re-election.”160
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Hamilton’s belief in legislative civic republicanism is challengeable on many
fronts, space for the development of which is not possible here. Most glaringly, her faith
in the possibility of an ideal legislator, unsullied by the whispers and tugs of special
interests, is confounding. Hamilton appears to have traded in one set of rose-colored
glasses for another. Though she grudgingly acknowledges that legislatures often fail to
perform their duties in the way that she conceives them,161 she nevertheless insists that
individualized decisions by legislatures about accommodation are best suited to serve the
common good. Whither her Calvinistic pessimism,162 so prominentwhen the topic was
the abuses of religion or the oppressive instincts of the general populace?
Yet even if (1) we assume that legislators are capable of performing consistently
in the ways thatHamilton suggests, and (2) we accept her point that the legislature can
and should often act in anti-majoritarian fashion (a highly controversial proposition), and
(3) we accept as well her somewhat contradictory statements about the value of
“pluralism” in American society,163 we are simply left with another claim about the
institutional superiority of the legislature (now advocated as a matter of constitutional
161
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design) to other institutions as the voice of the public good. If the point is to justify
legislative civic republicanism as a theory of the substantive public good – that is, to
claim that the constitutional structure, as Hamilton argues for it, itselfadvances the publi c
good – it will not do to cite a few examples where the structure may have coincided with
what for Hamilton is the right result. As Hamilton herself is fully aware, there are at least
as many examples where she believes that the result was wrong. If the public good is to
have any substantive content, the model of legislative civic republicanism cannot provide
it.
e.

The Public Good as Policy Preference

The preceding sections examined four possible overarching commitments that
might have supported Hamilton’s concept of the public good, ones that she herself
intimated were closely related to the concept. They were not successful in explaining the
public good. Perhaps the problem is that Hamilton perceives the public good as a much
more pragmatic affair. Under this view, each legislator is simply to choose whatever
policies she prefers (free from untoward influences, of course) given any particular set of
circumstances. Laws that provide categorically for religious accommodation (as any
other categorical law) limit the legislator’s freedom to decide as she wills.
There is no doubt that Hamilton favors certain policies over others, and favors
many over those that advance religious accommodation. For example, religious
accommodation is less important to her than historic preservation,164 preventing the
spread of AIDS in Africa,165 clarity with respect to issues of child custody and
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inheritance,166 the right of homosexuals to marry,167 and the interests of residential
homeowners in maintaining their neighborhood characters.168 She may perhaps favor
religious accommodation over, for example, certain claims of educational disruption169
and the military’s interest in esprit de corps and unity.170
The difficulty with this theory of the public good is not that it relies on legislators’
(or Professor Hamilton’s) policy preferences. Indeed, we have been searching for some
substantive content to give shape to Hamilton’s conception of the public good; policy
preferences of one kind or another are a promising candidate for this task. Furthermore,
Professor Hamilton is at her most candid when she argues for her own policy preferences,
perhaps indicating that it is these personal beliefs rather than any grander theory that
often drives her impassioned rhetoric about the public good.
The problems with this approach are twofold. First, Hamilton has not explained
why the particular policies thatshe identifies should be universalized by the name “public
good.” That is, if what she wants is that the legislator be free to enact her (the
legislator’s) policypreferences, how can Hamilton claim that a religiously inclined
legislator, or one who favors religious accommodation, should instead share her
(Hamilton’s) view of the public good. Second, and relatedly, a theory of simple policy
preferences does not account for Hamilton’s particular skepticism about the value of
religious belief and accommodation in the public good calculus. It is to this point that I
turn next.
IV.

The Public Good as the Exclusion or Devaluation of
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Certain Religious Interests
It should by now be clear that Hamilton harbors a special distrust of certain
religious interests. Indeed, perhaps the principal merit of God vs. The Gavel is its often
harrowing portrayal of the abuses of religious organizations in contemporary American
culture and its clear-eyed examination of the considerable power of religious advocates
and lobbyists to promote their interests before Congress. Does Hamilton believe that
religious interests could play a role in her concept of the public good? Hamilton
frequently gestures in the direction of acknowledging some role for religious views. But
her comments on this front are resigned and somewhat depressed. She says that religion
is too deeply entrenched in the American psyche to be entirely extricated from the debate
over the public good.171 For Hamilton, religion is “everywhere,” “inescapable,” and
cannot be ignored.172
We are looking for a conceptual framework for understanding the type of
religious beliefs and interests that Hamilton would exclude from the sphere of public
judgment, and the type of religious beliefs and interests that she feels should be given no
greater weight than any other beliefs or interests. Hamilton certainly favors religious
liberty of a kind. She opposes laws that display patent animus toward particular
religions,173 and supports the freedom to speak and believe as one wills.174 However, she
also claims thatcertain religious interests have no legitimate place in the sphere of public
debate and she opposes giving special weight to religious beliefs when those beliefs run
up against other interests that government might deem
legitimate–
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that is, when the time

comes for legislative decisions (and we have already concluded that Hamilton believes
that it is the legislature that should be making these decisions) about the public good.
In order to understand better Hamilton’s idea of the public good, we need to
examine more closely and distinguish among the relevant kinds of religious interests that
she might or might not admit to the sphere of deliberation over and judgment about the
public good. A return to some of Professor Greenawalt’s fine divisions is useful. Let us
accept his claim (without undertaking a complete defense of the position) that a religious
interest is, first, “religious,” meaning that its source lies in some kind of “theistic belief or
other belief about a realm of ultimate value beyond, or deeper than, ordinary human
experience.”175 Second, it is an “interest”; the holder of the religiousbelief wishes to do
something with it. He may simply wish to believe it silently; or he may wish to impose it
as a law binding on himself and everyone else; or he may wish to do a host of other
things with it.
At one extreme of the possible range of religious interests lie what Greenawalt
has called the imposition of comprehensive religious beliefs. If Donna is a Christian
whose political judgments are shaped entirely by her belief in the literal truth of Holy
Scripture as the received will of God, Donna has a comprehensive religious belief.
Suppose thatDonna is a legislator and votes for a law that would establish Christianity,
as she understands it, as the supreme law of the land and would outlaw all other religious
beliefs. Her interest is one of imposition.176 I believe that Professor Hamilton177 (like
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most people) would oppose such a religious interest; she would want to exclude it from
consideration of the public good.178 If Donna, holding the same comprehensive religious
views, voted to pass a law outlawing gay marriage for the single reason that
homosexuality is anathema to God’s will (i.e., the imposition of a particular religious
belief by one who holds a comprehensive religious view),179 Hamilton would, in all
likelihood, argue not only that the putative law is unsound but also that Donna’s views
should be excluded from the public good calculus.180
Suppose, instead, that Phyllis’s reasons for voting for the ban on gay marriage
derive both from her religious convictions and from her views that the institution of
homosexual marriage cannot be rationally defended. Her underlying grounds are partly
religious; she believes that homosexual marriage is inconsistent with God’s will. But by
opposing homosexual marriage she does not wish to impose her religious views on
anyone else because, in addition to her religious reasons, she also feels strongly that the
institution and traditions of heterosexual marriage, and the secular human goods that it
serves, are harmed if gay marriage is not officially prohibited. Suppose that she is able to
adduce, say, statistical evidence that societies that permit homosexual marriage have
higher divorce rates for heterosexual marriages than those that prohibit homosexual
marriage, as well as other data that could support her secular belief in the harm of
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homosexual marriage.181 Hamilton, I believe, would exclude this religious interest from
public good considerations as well. Even if Hamilton might agree that there are some
legitimate, non-religious reasons for supporting the ban (which is doubtful),182 she would
claim that the reliance on a religious reason in this case is the overwhelming impetus for
the law. If the law were passed, it would compel “nonbelievers to conform to a standard
of conduct inspired in large measure by religious belief,”183 which amounts to a religious
imposition. Note that Hamilton’s reasons for excluding or giving very little to no weight
to this religious interest, as I have imagined them, would have little to do with what
Phyllis believes about her (Phyllis’s) position; they instead implicate what Hamilton (or
the ideal legislator) believes about those views.
One further illustration: Lisa believes that animals should not be treated
inhumanely. Her reasons for supporting a farming regulation governing the decent
treatment of animals before they are slaughtered stem in part from her belief that the
Bible demands concern for animals. However, she also is persuaded by secular
arguments that animals deserve a high degree of respect from humans. She has no wish
to see the law pass in order to impose her religious views on those that do not share them.
She thinks the law just because she cares about animals and her reasons are mixed.184
Structurally, Phyllis’s and Lisa’s positions are identical. Both have religious
interests. Neither wishes to impose her religious views on others. Each supports (or
believes that she supports) the prospective law in question for both religious and secular
181

I assume, for the sake of this argument, that Phyillis’s evidence could withstand some scrutiny, though it
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Id. at 52-66.
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[PCPR], at 58-59.
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reasons. Being religious themselves, both would find it exceedingly difficult to
disentangle and cull out the religious from the secular reasons for supporting the
respective laws. As Professor Steven Smith has said, “[t]he religious citizen supports not
two severable propositions but rather the single, complex proposition that secular and
religious influences must both play a part in public decisions.”185
Nevertheless, I believe that Hamilton would draw a distinction between the two
positions. Though she would exclude Phyllis’s religious interest from the domain of the
public good, she would admit Lisa’s. Her reason would be that, in this context, the
religious interest is reasonable because it closely aligns with legitimate secular interests.
“Citizens may speak from the heart and soul, but it is up to our elected officials to
contextualize the debate by adding the scope of the public good to all public
consideration.”186 By “contextualize the debate,” Hamilton means that the ideal
legislator should analyze the religious interest from a secular standpoint to determine
whether it should figure into his determination of the public good. In Lisa’s case, the
ideal legislator should consider her religious belief in light of the larger context of secular
reasons for the humane treatment of animals, balancing these against opposed interests, in
determining the public good. Hamilton would not give any more weight to Lisa’s
religious reasons than toother secular reasons, whether supporting or opposing th e law.
But she would include them in the calculus because they can be squarely reconciled with
convincing secular arguments in favor of her position.
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L. REV. 955, 1010 (1989).
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This is close to a skeptical or “prudential”187 argument for simple, secular policy
preferences. But it differs in an important way: it is a full-bodied belief in (or theory of)
the ability of the legislature to conduct an individuated inquiry and determination of the
reasonableness, by secular lights, of particular religious interests. For Hamilton, whether
religious interests can play a role in the public good will depend on their compatibility
with what the ideal legislator deems legitimate secular interests. If they are highly
compatible, the ideal legislator can include the religious interest as one more reason in his
assessment of the public good. If not, the religious interests are best given little or no
weight.
All of this – indeed, the entire tone and argumentation of the book – reinforces the
exquisitely particularized quality of Professor Hamilton’s public good theory and her
seemingly limitless faith in the powers and capabilities of legislators. It also grossly
overestimates the number of difficult moral and social issues that can be resolved
satisfactorily by reference to secular objectives alone. “[E]veryone must reach beyond
commonly accessible reasons to decide many social issues and . . . religious bases for
such decisions should not be disfavored in comparison with other possible bases.” 188
“Everyone” presumably includes legislators, even idealized ones, as Professor
Greenawalt cautiously acknowledges.189
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E.g., STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF
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Hamilton’s generally dim view of religious interests in the numerous examples
that she provides bespeaks a strong disinclination to countenance them in deciding what
is good policy(an aversion so powerful that it blinds her to the considerable legislative
abuses that she recounts). The accommodation of religious interests, she believes, often
tends to do more harm than good. For example, Hamilton argues that expansive religious
accommodation is more likely to lead to strife (interdenominational and otherwise),
which is itself inconsistent with the public good, than an approach that treats religious
interests no differently than any other interest.190 This view is especially in evidence in
her discussion of land use conflicts, where she claims that religious organizations have
sued to enforce their rights under RLUIPA “[i]nstead of finding a middle ground” with
their opponents.191 It also appears when Hamilton claims that religious accommodation
somehow injects discrimination into a dispute where it would not otherwise exist, making
rational, cool-headed, and just resolutions that would“serv[e]” everyone’s interest” more
difficult.192 In fact, however, Hamilton points to no evidence that religiously motivated
strife in contemporary America is more rampant, noxious, or divisive than strife of any
other kind.193

In the face of Greenawalt’s arguments, I am less persuaded that total nonreliance is ideal. In fact,
in what follows Greenawalt himself does not argue for total nonreliance, but identifies certain nuances
(e.g., intensity of conviction and notions of serious wrongs, id. at 238) that might affect the propriety of
reliance on religious belief.
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In the end, Hamilton’s view of the public good is best characterized as one in
which religious interests might shape policy, but only if they can be justified to a high
degree by secular reasons. Her profound disillusionment with the moral authority of
religious organizations and persons left her seeking a repository for her conviction that
somebody, or some entity, should be acting in the public interest. With plausible
constitutional reason, she has selected the legislature to be the bearer of her trust. But the
task she has assigned to it – to decide, case-by- case, whether specific religious interests
deserve government protection by reference to their secular worth – is beyond both the
legislature’s institutional abilities and its members’ personal capacity for moral judgment.

see also Michael W. McConnell, Five Reasons to Reject the Claim That Religious Arguments Should Be
Excluded From Democratic Deliberation, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 639, 643 (1999) (“[T]he supposed
divisiveness, intolerance, and absolutism of religious argument neither distinguishes it nor provides a
justification for exclusion from democratic politics[.]”).
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